WMD Commission to Continue Advocacy, Will Focus on Urgent Biosecurity Issues
Bob Graham and Jim Talent
Commission Issue Brief, September 7, 2009
Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013—and that a biological attack is more likely than nuclear.
This was the unanimous conclusion, in December 2008, of the bipartisan Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Congress created our Commission, as an outgrowth of the 9/11 Commission, to address the grave threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses to the United States.
The then-Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell publicly agreed with the Commission’s threat assessment, saying “we [the intelligence community] assess biological as the more likely and it’s better than an even chance in the next five years that an attack by one of those weapons systems will be conducted in some place on the globe.…”
The Commission’s report, World at Risk, also recognized that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to the current circumstance of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and identified a series of specific actions to address these deficits. In particular, the Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to reduce the threat of bioterrorism.
Congress recently took the extraordinary action of extending the mandate of our Commission so that we can generate action on our recommendations. That is exactly what we will do. As the chair and vice chair, we intend to hold the government accountable by carefully observing the priority it gives to these issues and grading progress in implementing the Commission’s recommendations.
Nature of the Bio-Threat
A key mission over the coming months will be to educate policymakers and opinion leaders about the nature of the biothreat. Any strategy for preventing biological WMD needs to address fundamental differences between the technologies used for making nuclear and biological weapons.
Unlike nuclear weapons and materials, potentially dangerous biological agents are pervasive in nature, can be easy to manufacture and cannot easily be locked down. The skills to manipulate these agents can be found in pharmacies, laboratories, hospitals and universities around the world. And the capacity to spread weaponized agents? Every crop-dusting farmer knows the process for spraying live biological materials.
This means the country not only needs to secure materials and rely on instruments like the Biological Weapons Convention and U.N. Resolution 1540—but also aggressively enhance resilience at the local, state and federal levels. As the Commission wrote, “A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibiotics and vaccines, can potentially blunt the impact of an attack and thwart the terrorists’ objectives.”
A major part of a U.S. biodefense strategy should be based on reaching a level of preparedness that will effectively remove bioweapons from the category of WMD. If we succeed in limiting the effectiveness of a biological weapon, it would make such a weapon less attractive to those who intend to inflict harm.
Responsibility for biosecurity may already be falling through the cracks: there is no senior official for bio-preparedness in the Administration, only a patchwork quilt of offices and agencies. One of the most important U.S. bio-defense organizations—the Biomedical Advanced Research Development Authority—is facing threats to funding and programs.
Leadership on WMD
Part of the Commission’s focus has been to emphasize government reform, ranging from implementing restructuring that would improve coordination and oversight to ensuring a talented national security workforce in the future. Recently, we wrote to President Obama, recommending that he put Vice President Biden in charge of an aggressive campaign to meet the nation’s WMD challenges, particularly the biothreat.
In April, President Obama outlined a bold path on nuclear nonproliferation—reflecting many of the Commission’s recommendations. The Administration then announced that Vice President Biden will lead our efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This demonstrated a good understanding of the Vice President’s strengths: long experience in nonproliferation and skill at getting things done in Washington. But the President’s definition of the WMD threat and the Vice President’s role are both too narrow.
We believe that Vice President Biden should be in charge of the entire WMD and terrorism portfolio, including and especially the biothreat. Consistent also with the recommendations of the Project on National Security Reform’s November 2008 report, Forging a New Shield, there must be one senior official in the administration whom everyone understands has the authority to speak for the president and to resolve disputes in a timely manner between cabinet secretaries. Only then will it become a top priority across agencies and departments. Put simply, there are only two people in Washington that all cabinet secretaries address as “Sir.”
Action on Other Threats
The biothreat is the most urgent and one where we feel the Commission can make the most difference. However, in the coming months, the Commission will be tracking other critical areas, including nuclear security, government reform and citizen engagement. Throughout the process, we will be sounding the alarm on the threat itself, which drives the need for this change. Among the recommendations we will be tracking are:
Nuclear Security: We must press for a broader agenda at the upcoming Global Security Summit this fall, to include substantive discussion of (1) a range of penalties for violations of or withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty that shifts the burden of proof to the state under review for noncompliance, (2) establishment of a nuclear fuel bank for non-nuclear states that agree not to develop sensitive fuel cycle capabilities, (3) strengthening the authorities and increasing the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (4) promoting further expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and (5) establishing an effective program, consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, to account for nuclear materials, so that they will be part of the agenda for adoption at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
The Commission believes that the nuclear weapons programs of both Iran and North Korea must be halted. Failure to do so will almost certainly ensure that over the next several years several new nuclear states will emerge along the Pacific Rim and across the Middle East. We recognize the intense challenges involved.
Government Reform: The Senate and House Homeland Security Committees should be empowered as the sole oversight committees for the Department of Homeland Security and all agencies under the Department’s jurisdiction. In 2008, 195 Homeland Security officials testified a total of 146 times before 48 House and Senate committees and subcommittees. The amount of time, both of principles and staff, to support so many separate hearings constitutes an unnecessary drain on the Department’s resources. Decidedly better oversight would be achieved if this authority were consolidated. Absent this action, there is no way for Congress to develop the ability to effectively conduct oversight of crosscutting terrorism and WMD issues.
We must also accelerate the integration among counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism and law-enforcement communities to more effectively address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues, and strengthen expertise in nuclear and biological fields.
As mentioned, the country must recruit, train and retain a professional national security workforce to meet the challenges of this century. The best way to do so is through legislation and executive orders that combine the most successful aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols bill, to include mandatory joint assignments to serve in senior leadership positions, tuition assistance programs, and an ROTC-like educational program for junior intelligence officers.
Engaging U.S. Citizens and Ensuring Local and State Preparedness: Americans must become more involved in the business of preparedness in the event of a man-made or natural disaster. Much of the support and assistance needed to deal with the aftermath of a disaster will come not from the federal government, but from local and state officials, and from organizations within the community.
These recommendations are not a complete listing of those made in the Commission’s report; however, they convey the scope of changes needed for the U.S. government and society to more effectively prepare to deter and deal with the aftermath of a WMD attack. In order to achieve a higher level of preparedness and safety for the American people, U.S. policymakers must act on the serious and growing threat of WMD terrorism. As we stated in World At Risk:
“Our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. We know what we must do to counter the risk. There is no excuse now for allowing domestic partisanship…to prevent or delay the actions that must be taken….There is still time to defend ourselves, if we act with the urgency called for by the nature of the threat that confronts us.”
