Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism Report Card
Bob Graham and Jim Talent
Overview
In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released a unanimous threat assessment: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. That weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear.
Less than a month after this assessment, then Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell publicly endorsed it.
The assessment was based on four factors.
- First, there is direct evidence that terrorists are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
- Second, acquiring WMD fits the tactical profile of terrorists. They understand the unique vulnerability of first-world countries to asymmetric weapons—weapons that have a far greater destructive impact than the power it takes to acquire and deploy them. The airplanes that al Qaeda flew into the World Trade Center were asymmetric weapons.
- Third, terrorists have demonstrated global reach and the organizational sophistication to obtain and use WMD. As recent actions by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula demonstrate, the al Qaeda network is expanding through international partnerships. In particular, it is well within their present capabilities to develop and use bioweapons. As the Commission’s report, World at Risk, found, if al Qaeda recruits skilled bioscientists, it will acquire the capability to develop and use biological weapons.
- Fourth, the opportunity to acquire and use such weapons is growing exponentially because of the global proliferation of nuclear material and biological technologies. Almost fourteen months have passed since the Commission issued its World at Risk. That means nearly a quarter of the five-year margin of shrinking safety has passed.
During that time, the risk has continued to grow.
This is not meant to question the good faith or deny the dedication of anyone in the government. The fact is that first-world democracies are particulary vulnerable to asymmetric attack, especially from organizations that have no national base and therefore, are undeterred by the threat of retaliation. So although everyone wants
to prevent such attacks, and the government made progress toward that end in certain areas, the forces and factors that imperil the country have been outracing defensive efforts and overwhelming good intentions.
It is possible that fortuitous circumstances may reduce the anticipated risk. Outside forces may change and render more benign the groups that are working against us, or as in the case of the Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day, an attack may occur but fail in execution to the point that the destructive impact is minimal.
But the United States cannot count on such good fortune. Plans must be based on the assumption that what is likely to occur, given the current trajectory of risk, WILL occur, unless the trajectory is reversed. And on the current course, what is likely to occur within a very few years is an attack using weapons of mass destruction—probably a bioweapon—that will fundamentally change the character of life for the world’s
democracies.
In reaction to the Christmas Day attack, President Barack Obama stated that he would do everything in his power to support the men and women in intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security to ensure they have the tools and resources to keep America safe. He promised to “leave no stone unturned in seeking better ways to protect the American people.” It is in this spirit of protecting America that the Commission made its recommendations, and it is in this spirit that the report card was developed.
The assessment is not a good one, particularly in the area of biological threats. While the government has made progress on preventing such attacks, it is simply not paying consistent and urgent attention to the means of responding quickly and effectively so that they no longer constitute a threat of mass destruction. The failures did not begin with the current group of leaders. Each of the last three Administrations has been slow to
recognize and respond to the biothreat. The difference is that the danger has grown to the point that we no longer have the luxury of a slow learning curve. The clock is ticking, and time is running out.
Failure to Understand Nature of Biothreat
The evolution of the nature of the threat is nowhere more pronounced than in the area of biological weapons. A revolution in biotechnology continues, expanding potentially dangerous dual-use capabilities across the globe. As the delayed response to H1N1 has demonstrated, the United States is woefully behind in its capability to rapidly produce vaccines and therapeutics, essential steps for adequately responding to a biological threat,
whether natural or man-made.
H1N1 came with months of warning. But even with time to prepare, the epidemic peaked before most Americans had access to vaccine. A bioattack will come with no such warning. Response is a complex series of links in a chain of resilience necessary to protect the United States from biological attacks. Rapid detection and diagnosis capabilities are the first links, followed by providing actionable information to federal, state, and local leaders and the general public; having adequate supplies of appropriate medical countermeasures; quickly distributing those countermeasures; treating and isolating the sick in medical facilities; protecting the well through vaccines and prophylactic medications; and in certain cases, such as anthrax, environmental cleanup.
We conclude that virtually all links are weak, and require the highest priority of attention from the Administration and Congress.
The Chair and Vice Chair believe that this lack of preparedness and a consistent lack of action, even on fundamental issues like provision of adequate high-level expertise and investment in medical countermeasures,is a symptom of a failure of the U.S. government to grasp the threat of biological weapons.
Whereas the Administration has demonstrated a keen understanding of the nuclear threat and has set in motion a series of policies that all hope will bear fruit, there has been no equal sense of urgency displayed towards the threat of a large-scale biological weapons attack.
Positive Strides to Address Nuclear Threat
President Obama has undertaken substantial effort to bolster the nonproliferation regime. From his April 2009 speech in Prague to his chairmanship of a United Nations Security Council meeting on the subject and plans for a Global Summit on Nuclear Security, he is attempting to bend current trend lines.
We have some concerns in the nuclear arena, particularly regarding the Administration’s failure to prevent the lapse of verification mechanisms established under the START treaty. Ensuring their continuation was very important and insufficient attention was paid to it.
The U.S. government has placed priority on Iran and North Korea, and much attention and resources have been spent on Pakistan, but progress has been slow. The Chair and Vice Chair are gravely concerned about these regions. Recognizing the limited leverage the United States has in addressing them and the time-consuming
nature of diplomacy, as the Administration works to deepen global resolve to act, we underscore the unacceptable consequences of failure.
The U.S. government must strengthen the nonproliferation regime, develop more effective policies to eliminate terrorist havens in Pakistan, and galvanize allies to stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs.
Iran and North Korea
No grade is provided for Iran and North Korea in recognition of the broad nature and ambition of the Commission’s recommendation to “stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs.” In World at Risk, the Commission stated that because of the dynamic international environment, it would not address the precise tactics that should be employed by the next administration to achieve this strategic objective. However,
the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea pose immediate and urgent threats to their respective regions and to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which could trigger a dangerous cascade of proliferation. The actions of both countries in the past year have only increased these threats. Iran has rebuffed negotiating efforts, been exposed in its pursuit of a covert uranium enrichment site, and stated its intention to build additional facilities in defiance of UN Security Council mandates. It has also violently crushed its own domestic political opposition. North Korea has conducted both nuclear and missile tests. With Iran, the Administration has reacted with extreme patience but now appears poised to push for strengthened sanctions (a step supported by the House of Representatives in a sanctions bill passed in December 2009). Regarding North
Korea, the Administration succeeded in tightening multilateral sanctions on the country with Security Council Resolution 1874, but direct diplomatic engagement has failed to bring North Korea back into the six-nation talks. The Commission is deeply concerned with these events and the time that has been lost in 2009. Failure to stop Iran and North Korea could result in a cascade of proliferation, which would dramatically increase the
likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Failure on Government Reform and Building a National Security Workforce
As former members of the U.S. Senate, the Chair and Vice Chair are enormously frustrated at the inability of Congress to reform its own oversight of the nation’s homeland security agency.
The Chair and Vice Chair recognize the immense domestic challenges faced by Congress and the new Administration over the past year, including the financial crisis and health care reform, but believes that there should have been room for the structural procedures necessary to face the critical national security issue of protecting Americans from WMD threats.
As an independent branch of the U.S. government, Congress has an essential role to play in ensuring ournational security—through authorization, appropriation, and oversight. It is essential to the safety of the American citizen that these functions are carried out competently.
For instance, the authorization, appropriation, and oversight for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are spread across more than 80 committees and subcommittees. This ensures that Congress will continue to lack a deep understanding of the important and interrelated security and intelligence policy issues
that face the nation. This fragmentation guarantees that much of what Congress does will be duplicative and disjointed.
Oversight of DHS should be removed from legacy committees and focused within the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees.
The refusal of Congress, as the nation’s elected representatives, to pull congressional authority together into one coherent oversight body is both self-serving and conspicuous, suggesting that individual concerns for “turf” supersede the legislature’s willingness to assume responsibility to ensure national security.
Although the executive branch has made improvements in integrating the efforts of various departments and agencies, much work remains, as demonstrated by the Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day. That thwarted attack exposed not only the inability of various intelligence agencies to provide protection, but also the inability
of Congress to provide oversight.
In addition, both the Administration and Congress are well aware of the need to substantially improve how our federal departments, agencies, and the national laboratories hire and retain highly skilled personnel. The aging of our national security workforce has been a growing problem for over a decade, and yet little has been done
by either branch of government.
If these long-standing deficiencies in executive agency operations and congressional oversight of homeland security, intelligence, and other crosscutting 21st century issues are not corrected, the United States will remain woefully underprepared to respond to the growing WMD threat.
The Commission emphasized in World at Risk that there is a vital connection between the process of making decisions and decisions made, or not made. In other words, if the process is balkanized; if there are no “integrators” to make sure agencies or committees work together; if experienced, senior officials are not put into the crucial positions, then the people can expect that little or nothing will be done—despite the good will of top authorities.
Progress on Citizen and Community Preparedness
A well-informed, organized, and engaged citizenry remains the country’s greatest resource. The federal government has made some progress in supporting the development of preparedness and resilience of state and local governments, business and non-profit communities, and individual citizens. Efforts, such as development of a checklist that citizens can use to ensure the readiness of their local governments, need to be
expanded to ensure that all communities and citizens are prepared in the event of a WMD attack.
